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CASENOTES

BANKRUPTCY:

SUSPENSION

OF DRIVING

PRIVILEGES AFTER

BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE FOR FAILURE TO FILE PROOF OF FuTURE FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PURSUANT TO THE OHIO FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT NOT DISCRIMINATORY UNDER 11

U.S.C. § 525(a) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE-Duffey v. Dollison,
734 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1984).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1978, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act.1 A stated
purpose of this act was "to modernize the bankruptcy law by codifying
a new title 11 that [would] embody the substantive law of bankruptcy."'2 One such embodiment of substantive law was the codification
of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Perez v. Campbell.3
The specific rule in Perez, which was codified in section 525(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code,4 nullifies any state law which discriminates against
bankrupts solely on the basis of nonpayment of a debt discharged in
bankruptcy.6 Although section 525(a) enumerates various forms of prohibited, discriminatory activities, 6 the legislative history of the BankI. IIU.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982).
2. S.REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. I,reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5787, 5787 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
3. 402 U.S. 637 (1971). InPerez, the Supreme Court held that the congressional policy of a
fresh start for the debtor would be frustrated ifa state were permitted to refuse to renew a
driver's privileges because of an unpaid tort
judgment, even though that judgment was discharged
in bankruptcy. Id. at 648.
4. II U.S.C. § 525 (1982), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 333, 354-55;
SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5867.
5. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5867.
6. 11 U.S.C. § 525 (1982), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 333, 354-55.
Section 525(a) provides as follows:
Except as provided in the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930 (7 U.S.C.
499a-499s), the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921 (7 U.S.C. 181-229), and section I of
the Act entitled "An Act making appropriations for the Department of Agriculture for the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1944, and for other purposes," approved July 12, 1943 (57 Stat.
422; 7 U.S.C. 204), a governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew
a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant to, condition such a grant to,
discriminate with respect to such a grant against, deny employment to, terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment against, a person that is or has
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ruptcy Code indicates that this enumeration was not intended to limit
the courts in defining what constitutes discrimination against bankrupts.7 Duffey v. Dollison8 is a prime example of judicial development
of the Perez rule.
In Duffey, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that it was not discriminatory to deny renewal of driving privileges to the plaintiffs, whose privileges were suspended when they
failed to file proof of future financial responsibility, even though their
accident-related judgments under the Ohio Financial Responsibility
Act 9 had been discharged in bankruptcy. 10 The precise issue raised in
Duffey was whether provisions of the Ohio Financial Responsibility
Act,11 pursuant to which the Duffeys' driver's licenses and registrations
were withheld, violated section 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which
prohibits discriminatory actions by a governmental unit that interfere
with the "fresh start" 2 allowed the debtor.1 The Duffey court held

been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or a debtor under the Bankruptcy Act, or
another person with whom such bankrupt or debtor has been associated, solely because
such bankrupt or debtor is or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or debtor
under the Bankruptcy Act, has been insolvent before the commencement of the case under
this title, or during the case but before the debtor is granted or denied a discharge, or has
not paid a debt that is dischargeable in the case under this title or that was discharged
under the Bankruptcy Act.
Id.
7. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5867. This Senate Report also noted that the
effect of the section [525(a)] is not so broad as a comparable section proposed by the
Bankruptcy Commission, S. 236, 94th Cong., IstSess. § 4-508 (1975), which would have
extended the prohibition to any discrimination, even by private parties. Nevertheless, it is
not limiting either, as noted. The courts will continue to mark the contours of the antidiscrimination provision in pursuit of sound bankruptcy policy.
Id.
8. 734 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1984).
9. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4509.01-79, .99 (Page 1982 & Page Supp. 1983).
10. Duffey, 734 F.2d at 274.
I1. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.37 (Page Supp. 1983); id. § 4509.40 (Page 1982). Section 4509.37 provides for the suspension and reinstatement of a driver's license, registration, and
privilege. "The registrar of motor vehicles upon receipt of a certified copy of a judgment, shall
forthwith suspend the license and registration . . . privilege of any person against whom such
judgment was rendered .... " Id. § 4509.37.
Section 4509.40 provides for continuation of the suspension until settlement of judgment "for
a period of seven years from the effective date of suspension . . . .The registrar shall vacate the
order of suspension upon proof that such judgment is stayed, or satisfied in full . . .and upon
such person's filing with the registrar of motor vehicles evidence of financial responsibility .
Id. § 4509.40.
12. The "fresh start" policy provides that the honest but unfortunate bankrupt will be given
a "new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the-pressure and
discouragement of preexisting debt." Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). See also
Comment, Protectionof a Debtor's "Fresh Start" under the New Bankruptcy Code, 29 CATH. U.
L. REV. 843, 846-50 (1980).
13. Duffey, 734 F.2d at 266.
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that the provisions of the Ohio Financial Responsibility Act were not in
conflict with the discrimination prohibitions of section 525(a) and,
therefore, were not invalidated by the supremacy clause.14
This note will examine the construction of the Ohio Financial Responsibility Act, 15 as well as the legislative history and construction of
section 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code."6 This note will also examine
the applicability of the supremacy clause, the development of the Perez
rule, and the ramifications of the Duffey decision.
II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

On June 18, 1979, an automobile accident-related judgment was
rendered against George Duffey in the Municipal Court of Franklin
County, Ohio. 7 Mr. Duffey failed to satisfy this judgment within 30
days and, consequently, Registrar of Motor Vehicles Dean Dollison
suspended Mr. Duffey's operator's license and vehicle registration pursuant to section 4509.37 of the Ohio Financial Responsibility Act."8 On
May 23, 1980, an automobile accident-related judgment was also rendered against Shari Duffey, the wife of George Duffey.'" This judgment was also not satisfied; consequently, Mrs. Duffey's driving privileges were likewise suspended.2"
The Duffeys subsequently filed a voluntary, joint bankruptcy petition pursuant to Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 2' listing the two
unsatisfied, accident-related judgments in their schedule of debts. 22 The
couple later forwarded a copy of this schedule to Registrar Dollison,
along with a request that their driving privileges be reinstated.2 3 Registrar Dollison recognized that the judgment debts were dischargeable
and that satisfaction or reaffirmance of the debts could not be required
as a condition to reobtaining their driving privileges. 24 The registrar,
nevertheless, refused to lift the suspension because the Duffeys had
failed to file evidence of financial responsibility as required by section

14. Id. at 274. There was no supremacy clause problem because the state statute was not
found to be in conflict with the federal act. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2.
15. OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4509.01-.79, .99 (Page 1982 & Supp. 1983).
16. II U.S.C. § 525 (1982), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 333, 354-55.
17. Duffey v. Dollison, 734 F.2d 265, 267 (6th Cir. 1984).
18. Id. The Ohio Financial Responsibility Act is codified at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4509.37 (Page Supp. 1983); id. § 4509.40 (Page 1982). See supra note 11.
19. Duffey, 734 F.2d at 267.
20. Id.
21. Id. Chapter 7 provides for the collection, liquidation, and distribution of the bankrupt's
estate. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-66 (1982).
22. Duffey, 734 F.2d at 267.
23. Id.
24. Id.; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4509.40 (Page 1982); id. § 4509.45 (Page Supp. 1983).
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4509.40 of the Ohio Revised Code.2 5
As a result of the registrar's action, the Duffeys brought suit in
Bankruptcy Court seeking the reinstatement of their driving privileges. 26 The Duffeys argued that the registrar had violated section
525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code 27 by refusing to issue their driver's licenses and registration. 8 The bankruptcy judge agreed with the position presented by the Duffeys and held that Ohio's proof of financial
responsibility requirement, as applied to individuals with unsatisfied
tort judgments discharged in bankruptcy, unconstitutionally conflicted
with the prohibition against discriminatory treatment of bankrupts provided by section 525(a). 9
Registrar Dollison subsequently appealed the bankruptcy court's
decision to the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio.3 0 The district court reversed and held that the proof of financial responsibility requirement did not violate section 525(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code because the requirement was applied without discrimination to both bankrupts and nonbankrupts. 1'
The Duffeys appealed the district court's decision to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.3 2 The Sixth Circuit Court, in Duffey v. Dollison,s3 affirmed the district court's holding and reiterated the district
court's finding that "[tihe statute [section 4509.40] applies without exception to any person who fails to satisfy a judgment for whatever reason, whether because of unwillingness, inadvertence, or inability to
pay."134 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the Duffeys were not discriminated against for purposes of section 525(a) because they were not
treated any differently than were other judgment-debtors.3 5 Furthermore, the court noted that to hold otherwise would give the Duffeys a
"'head start over persons who are able to satisfy their unpaid judgment

25. Duffey, 734 F.2d at 267. Pursuant to § 4509.40, once judgment has been fixed, driving
privileges are suspended until the judgment is stayed or satisfied and until proof of financial responsibility is filed with the registrar. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.40 (Page 1982).
26. Duffey, 734 F.2d at 267. See Duffey v. Dollison, 13 Bankr. 785 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1981), rev'd, No. C-2-81-1154 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 13, 1982), aff'd, 734 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1984).
27. II U.S.C. § 525 (1982), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 333, 354-55.
28. Duffey, 734 F.2d at 267.
29. In re Duffey, 13 Bankr. at 788.
30. Duffey, 734 F.2d at 267. See Duffey v. Dollison, No. C-2-81-1154, slip op. at 8 (S.D.
Ohio Aug. 13, 1982).
31. Duffey, 734 F.2d at 267.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 265-73.
34. Id. at 267, 273.
35. Id. at 274.
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debts without resort to a discharge in bankruptcy.' "1 In reaching this
decision, the Sixth Circuit was faced with a supremacy clause issue,
and accordingly, looked to the legislative history behind both the Ohio
Financial Responsibility Act and section 525(a).17 Additionally, the
Duffey court examined the inconsistent judicial treatment of whether
discrimination against the bankrupt was to be viewed in relation to
judgment debtors as a class, as was ultimately held in Duffey, 38 or in
relation to all motorists in general.3 9
III.

BACKGROUND

A supremacy clause issue was present in Duffey v. Dollison'° because it was disputed whether section 4509.40 of the Ohio Financial
Responsibility Act, 4 ' which requires proof of financial responsibility of
all judgment debtors, was discriminatory in light of section 525(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code. 2 The Supreme Court has clearly stated that it is
a primary function of the court to determine whether a state statute
"'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.' "' In order to determine this, the
Supreme Court has established a two-part test which requires that the
court first ascertain the construction and the objectives of both the federal and the state statutes and, second, that the court determine the
constitutional question of whether the two statutes are in conflict. 4 Accordingly, it is necessary to consider the objectives of section 525(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code as well as the construction of the Ohio Financial
Responsibility Act.
A.

The Federal Bankruptcy Code

The issue of bankruptcy was initially addressed by the Framers in
the Constitution whereby Congress was given the power to establish
"uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States.' 5 Congress has exercised this bankruptcy authority on five oc-

36. Id. at 273 (quoting In re Cerny, 17 Bankr. 221, 224 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982)).
37. Duffey. 734 F.2d at 269-71.
38. Id. at 267.
39. Id. at 273.
40. 734 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1984).
41. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.40 (Page 1982).
42. I1 U.S.C. § 525 (1982), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 333, 354-55.
43. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)).
44. Perez, 402 U.S. at 644.
45. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4. For a general discussion of the development of bankruptcy
laws since early Roman times, see Kennedy, Reflections on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States: The Debtor's Fresh Start, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 427 (1974).
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casions. 46 The last occasion, which was the adoption of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1978, presented a major shift in the balance between debtors'
and creditors' interests during bankruptcy from that which had traditionally been recognized.4 ' The primary objective of the new bankruptcy code 48 was to enable debtors to maintain "independent economic
existences after bankruptcy"' 49 while preserving and strengthening the
rights of creditors.5 0 Bankruptcy legislation has long recognized the importance of balancing the desire of creditors to have maximized returns
with the desire of debtors to be left as a viable economic entity. 1
Historically, the states determined what property debtors could retain.5 2 This naturally resulted in a wide variety of treatments accorded
53
to debtors that led to the encouragement of extensive forum shopping.
The constitutional mandate for uniform bankruptcy laws54 seemed forgotten. In 1970, however, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States was created to analyze and recommend changes in
the then existing bankruptcy code of 1898.88 The commission found
that the act's deference to state law concerning exemptions was intolerable because it created a lack of uniformity and resulted in either the
denial or loss of exemptions due to inequitable state provisions allowing
waiver. 56 The commission recommended, therefore, that uniform ex-

46. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803); Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch.
9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843); Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878);
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, amended by Act of June 22, 1938 (Chandler Act),
ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92
Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982)).
It should be noted that there has been an amendment to this last revision which affected
various sections of Title 11, including § 525. 11 U.S.C. § 525 (1982), amended by Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 333, 354-55. The only significant change to § 525 was the addition of
subsection (b) which prohibits private employers from discriminating against an individual employee because of that employee's status as a bankrupt or relationship to a bankrupt. Id. Subsection (b) is not at issue in this note.
47. Comment, supra note 12, at 843. Traditionally, a maximal return for creditors has been
emphasized in bankruptcy statutes. Id.
48. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982).
49. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5787, 5966 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
50. Id.
51. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934); Williams v. United States Fidelity
& Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549 (1915).
52. Comment, supra note 12, at 844. See generally 31 AM. JUR. 2D Exemptions §§ 33-119
(1967).
53. Comment, supra note 12, at 845.
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
4.
55. HousE REPORT, supra note 49, at 5963.
56. Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., Ist
Sess., Part I (1973), reprintedin 2 BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
169 (1979).
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emptions be enacted to ensure that debtors would be given a realistic
57
fresh start after bankruptcy.
In accordance with the commission's recommendations, Congress
included section 525(a) in the revised, 1978 Bankruptcy Code.5 8 As
noted earlier, section 525(a) was a codification of Perez v. Campbell,59
which held a provision of the Arizona Financial Responsibility Act 0
invalid under the supremacy clause6 l because the debtor was denied a
fresh start.6 2 Section 525(a) was incorporated into the bankruptcy code
to provide additional protection to the debtor; specifically, the section
was designed to protect the debtor from discriminatory treatment resulting from state actions which frustrated the congressional fresh start
policy.6 3 Section 525(a) provides in pertinent part that:
[A] governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend or refuse to renew
a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant to, condition
such a grant to, discriminate with respect to such a grant against, deny
employment to, terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment against, a person that is or has been . . . a bankrupt or a debtor under the Bankruptcy Act . . .
B.

The Ohio Financial Responsibility Act

The Ohio Financial Responsibility Act,6 5 originally adopted in
1935 and amended in 1943, was subsequently revised in 1953.66 This
1953 revision was declared unconstitutional, in light of Perez v. Campbell,67 to the extent that it required payment of the judgment, despite a
stay or discharge, before reinstatement of driving privileges.6 8 This de-

57. Id. at 169, 177.
58. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5787; 11 U.S.C. § 525 (1982), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 333, 354-55.
59. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
60. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1163(B) (1956), amended by § 28-1163 (Supp. 1983).
Pursuant to the abrogated provision, a bankrupt was required to pay the judgment debt, even
though the debt was discharged in bankruptcy. Id.
61. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
62. Perez, 402 U.S. at 654, 656.
63.

SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5867.

64. 11 U.S.C. § 525 (1982), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 333, 354-55.
See supra note 6 for the full provision.
65. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4509.01-.79, .99 (Page 1982 & Supp. 1983).
66. Vorys, The New Ohio Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law, 50 OHIo OP. 102
(1953). In 1926 Connecticut became the first state to enact a financial responsibility law, and
other states soon followed Connecticut's lead. Id. at 103.
67. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
68. by
Weaver
v. O'Grady,
350 F. Supp. 403, 407 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
Published
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fect was eliminated by an amendment to the 1953 revision.6 9
The objective of the Ohio Financial Responsibility Act is to promote safety on Ohio roadways70 and to provide incentive "for motorists
to make themselves financially responsible." 7 1 As one commentator has
stated:
The law, as indicated by its title, is a safety measure and by its provisions places a premium on safe driving. It is the purpose of the law to
remove the irresponsible driver from the road, and to give reasonable
assurance that those owners and drivers of motor vehicles who fail to
meet their obligations under the law, either by means of insurance or by
some other means, will forfeit the privilege of owning or operating a motor vehicle in Ohio. This privilege will be taken away from those who
neither respect nor remember the rights of other people who use the
72
same streets and highways of Ohio.
Thus, the Ohio legislature intended that motor vehicle owners and operators would be encouraged to obtain a sufficient amount of liability
insurance to cover any costs that might arise through negligent operation of a motor vehicle.7
Procedurally, the Ohio Financial Responsibility Act requires: (1)
reporting of accidents; (2) proof of financial responsibility in sufficient
amount to satisfy any judgments for accident-related damages; (3)
upon conviction of particular traffic offenses or upon failure to satisfy
an accident-related judgment, the filing of proof of future financial responsibility for possible liability for subsequent accidents which might
occur; and (4) suspension of driving privileges for failure, either to
make the required security deposit for previous accidents, or to file
proof of future financial responsibility.7 4 These procedural measures are
the means by which the legislature seeks to attain its objective of safe
75
highways.
The specific portion of the Ohio Financial Responsibility Act at
issue in Duffey v. Dollison 6 was section 4509.40 which provides for a
seven-year suspension of driving privileges upon nonpayment of an accident-related judgment.7 7 This order can be vacated only upon proof

69. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.01-79, .99 (Page 1982 & Supp. 1983).
70. City of Toledo v. Bernoir, 18 Ohio St. 2d 94, 100, 247 N.E.2d 740, 745 (1969).
71. Id. at 100, 247 N.E.2d at 745. See Reilly, The FinancialResponsibility Law, 28 OHIo
ST. B.A. REP. 429 (1955).
72. Crunelle, The Ohio Safety Responsibility Law, 15 OHIO ST. L.J. 178, 179 (1954).
73. lszczukiewicz v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 182 F. Supp. 733, 735 (N.D. Ohio
1960), affid, 290 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1961).
74. 7 OHIO JUR. 3d Automobiles and Other Vehicles § 120 (1978).
75. See supra notes 71 & 73.
76. 734 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1984).
77. Id. at 267.
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that the judgment is stayed or satisfied in full, and upon proof of future
financial responsibility. 8 Inclusion of the judgment on a bankruptcy
petition does constitute satisfaction of that judgment debt, thus the first
statutory requirement is met. 79 Proof of financial responsibility is satisfied only upon such proof being filed with the registrar of motor vehicles; this proof of financial responsibility may be in the form of a certificate of insurance, a deposit of money or securities, a bond, or selfinsurance. 80 The courts have maintained inconsistent positions on the
issue of whether a state can constitutionally require proof of financial
responsibility when the judgment has been satisfied by discharge in
bankruptcy. 81

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Inconsistent Judicial Treatment

Since the United States Supreme Court's first encounter with the
conflict between section 525(a) and some state financial responsibility
acts in Perez v. Campbell,82 a number of other courts have addressed
conflicts between section 525(a) and financial responsibility enactments. Pursuant to the Perez decision, these courts determined whether
the particular state financial responsibility provisions were in conflict
with section 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and, thereby, in violation
of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.8" In resolving this issue, courts have maintained two contrary positions. Some
courts have found that the fresh start policy mandates that the bankrupt should be treated the same as a judgment debtor whose judgment
debt has been stayed, or has been satisfied by payment or by some
comparable means. 84 Other courts have found that the fresh start policy mandates that the bankrupt be treated as if the debt had never
been incurred; that is, the debtor should be treated the same as a person who has never incurred such a debt. 85 A brief synopsis of the hold-

78. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.40 (Page 1982).
79. Perez, 402 U.S. at 638. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1) (1982) which provides that a
discharge:
voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent that such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged under section
727 [the provision for discharge of a debt under Chapter 7 pursuant to which the Duffeys'
debts were discharged] . . . of this title, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived.
Id.
80. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.40 (Page 1982); id. § 4509.45 (Page Supp. 1983).
81. See infra text accompanying notes 82-116.
82. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
83. U.S. CONST. art. Vi, cl. 2.
84. See infra text accompanying notes 87-94.
85. See infra text accompanying notes 100-14.
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ings in these conflicting cases will be helpful in understanding the efwhy the
fects of the two positions noted above, as well as understanding
8
1
Dollison.
v.
Duffey
in
did
it
as
ruled
Circuit
Sixth
The Duffey court cited a number of decisions in which the courts
upheld the validity of state acts requiring judgment debtors to file proof
of future financial responsibility, while finding that the bankrupt should
be treated the same as a debtor whose debt had been stayed, or had
been satisfied by payment or comparable means. 87 For example, in
House v. O'Grady8 8 an Ohio common pleas court upheld the suspension
of the appellant's driving privileges because the appellant had failed to
file the requisite proof of financial responsibility, even though the judgment was discharged in bankruptcy.8 9 The House court concluded that,
while a discharge in bankruptcy satisfies payment of the judgment, the
discharge does not satisfy the requirement of proof of future financial
responsibility.90
Likewise, in 1982, in In re Cerny,9 1 the Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Ohio held that continued suspension of the bankrupt's driving privileges was valid because the bankrupt had not made
the required showing of future financial responsibility.92 The Cerny
court found that this requirement was consistent with the fresh start
policy protected in section 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, as the requirement was nondiscriminatorily applied to debtors and nondebtors
94
alike.9" The Cerny court did not expound on this finding.
95
The Duffey court, while recognizing both the Cerny and House98
decisions, also relied upon empirical data presented in Henry v.
Heyison.97 The Henry court cited evidence that 12,000 licensed, Penn-

86. 734 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1984).
87. Id. at 266-67, 269.
88. 35 Ohio Misc. 20 (C.P. Ct. Franklin County 1973).
89. Id. at 22. The facts of this case are similar to those in Duffey. The appellant's driver's
license was suspended pursuant to § 4509.37 of the Ohio Revised Code as a result of an accidentrelated foreign judgment. Id. at 21. Appellant then had the judgment discharged in bankruptcy
but was denied his license because he had failed to show that he had acquired financial responsibility insurance. Id.
90. Id. at 24.
91. 17 Bankr. 221 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982).
92. Id. at 224-25.
93. Id. at 224. The Cerny court also relied on the history of § 525(a) which "expressly
provides that a governmental unit may impose a future financial responsibility requirement upon
licensees so long as it is applied nondiscriminatorily." Id. (citing HR. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 367 (1977)).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. House, 35 Ohio Misc. 20.
97. 4 Bankr. 437 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980), cited in Duffey, 734 F.2d at 266. The Henry
court holding was contrary to the holding in Duffey. See infra text accompanying note 100.
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sylvania drivers had unsatisfied, accident-related judgments in 1979
and, as a result, had their licenses revoked; of those 12,000, 300 were
reported to have had their judgments discharged in bankruptcy. 98 The
Duffey court cited these statistics as an example of the pervasiveness of
the problem of irresponsible drivers who have discharged accident-related judgments in bankruptcy.99
The Duffey court did not address the holding in Henry that the
bankrupt did not have to file proof of financial responsibility because
"[o]nce a debt has been discharged under the Code a state may not
treat a debtor differently than a person who never incurred a debt."' 0 0
Moreover, the Duffey court dismissed the reasoning in three cases
which, like Henry, were contrary to House,'
Cerny, 02 and, ulti03
mately, its own decision.
Perez v. Campbell,'"' the seminal case, is
clearly distinguishable from Duffey because the Perez decision invalidated an Arizona law which required payment of the accident-related
judgment despite its discharge in bankruptcy. 0 5 The issue of whether
proof of future financial responsibility could be required was not addressed in Perez because the Arizona statute was clearly unconstitutional on grounds that it required payment despite the discharge."0 In
holding that the payment requirement was invalid, the Supreme Court
stated that "any state legislation which frustrates the full effectiveness
of federal law is rendered invalid by the Supremacy Clause.' 0 7 The
Supreme Court did not have to consider whether the discrimination
was in relation to the bankrupt judgment-debtor and other judgment
debtors, or in relation to the bankrupt judgment-debtor and nonjudgment-debtors, because it was clear that Arizona had frustrated the full
effectiveness of the Bankruptcy Code when it completely disregarded
the discharge of the judgment-debt in bankruptcy. 1 8

98. Henry, 4 Bankr. at 439 n.4.
99. Duffey, 734 F.2d at 266.
100. Henry, 4 Bankr. at 442.
101. House, 35 Ohio Misc. 20.
102. Cerny, 17 Bankr. 221.
103. Duffey, 734 F.2d 265. See infra text accompanying notes 104, 109 & 110.
104. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
105. Duffey, 734 F.2d at 272.
106. Perez, 402 U.S. at 642, 656. The Supreme Court maintains a policy that it will not
question the constitutionality of an action before it is necessary to do so. See Ashwander v.
T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936).
The Duffey court noted that a prior Ohio provision, similar to the one at issue in Perez, which
required payment of a discharged judgment debt, had also been held unconstitutional. Duffey, 734
F.2d at 269 (citing Weaver v. O'Grady, 350 F. Supp. 403, 407 (S.D. Ohio 1972)). See supra
notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
107. Perez, 402 U.S. at 652.
108. Mr. and Mrs. Perez had been discharged from all debts and claims which were provable against their estates, including the accident-related judgment. Id. at 639.
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Two other cases, Duffey v. Dollison u9 (the lower court decision)
and Shamblin v. Ohio,110 were heard in the Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of Ohio. In both cases"' the court found that it was
unconstitutional for a state to require proof of financial responsibility
when the judgment has been discharged in bankruptcy." 2 The
Shamblin court found that an individual who had an unsatisfied tort
judgment discharged in bankruptcy was discriminated against because
he was required to maintain proof of future financial responsibility,
while other individuals, who had never had a tort judgment, were not
so required.11 3 The bankruptcy court's decision in Duffey, which utilized language similar to that in Shamblin, has been reversed by the
Sixth Circuit in Duffey v. Dollison '" The Sixth Circuit rebutted the
reasoning in both Shamblin and the bankruptcy court's Duffey decision
by pointing out that "[w]here the obligation has thus become fixed,
neither payment of the judgment, nor arrangement with the creditor,
nor bankruptcy can relieve the debtor of the requirement of furnishing
proof of financial responsibility. '" 11 5
While the position maintained by the Shamblin, Duffey, and
Henry courts, that discrimination should be viewed as if the bankrupt's
debt had never been incurred, is a viable one, the Sixth Circuit's position that discrimination should be viewed as if the bankrupt's judgment
debt has been stayed or satisfied is equally viable. Moreover, the Sixth
Circuit gives further support to its position by expounding upon the
ramifications of the supremacy clause and the development of the Perez
rule. " 6
B.

Application of the Supremacy Clause
Pursuant to the supremacy clause, a state may not enact a law

In a dissenting opinion by Justice Blackmun, the validity of the Arizona statute was maintained primarily on the basis of stare decisis and protection of the general public. Id. at 668.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan and Stewart, did concede
that a state may require a bankrupt judgment-debtor to file proof of financial responsibility. Id.
109. 13 Bankr. 785 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981), rev'd, No. C-2-81-1154 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 13,
1982), affid, 734 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1984).
110. 18 Bankr. 800 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
111. Id.; Duffey, 13 Bankr. 785.
112. Shamblin, 18 Bankr. at 803; Duffey, 13 Bankr. at 788.
113. Shamblin, 18 Bankr. at 803.
114. 734 F.2d 265.
115. Id. at 274. The court continued:
In this respect the Ohio Act does not have the effect of discriminating between those who
are bankrupt and those who are not. It cannot induce the bankrupt to reaffirm a discharged
debt, or to pay thereafter, for neither action can affect the legal requirement to post proof
of financial responsibility.
116.

Id.
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which frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law. 117 In Perez,"1 ' the
Supreme Court found that determining "whether a state statute is in
conflict with a federal statute and hence invalid under the Supremacy
Clause is essentially a two-step process of first ascertaining the construction of the two statutes and then determining the constitutional
question whether they are in conflict."" 9
The constructions of the Ohio Financial Responsibility Act 20 and
of section 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code 21 have been clearly established on numerous occasions by the courts.12" The Ohio Financial Responsibility Act is a protective measure which requires motorists to
take financial responsibility for their negligent actions.12 3 Section
525(a) also acts as a protective measure; its primary objective, however, is to protect the debtor from post-bankruptcy discriminatory state
actions which frustrate the fresh start policy. 24 Given these settled
constructions of the state and federal statutes, the court must next determine whether the proof of future responsibility, required by the Ohio
Financial Responsibility Act, frustrates the debtor's fresh start that
section 525(a) is designed to protect.
In addressing the constitutional issue, the Duffey court looked to
the precise language of section 525(a) and the legislative history of that
section. 2 5 The Senate Report, discussing section 525(a), clearly stated
that the provision "does not prohibit consideration of other factors,
such as future financial responsibility or ability . . .if applied nondiscriminatorily. ' ' 2 The House Report, in like manner, states that:
[T]he prohibition [of section 525(a)] does not extend so far as to prohibit examination of the factors surrounding bankruptcy, the imposition
of financial responsibility rules if they are not imposed only on former

117. Perez, 402 U.S. at 652. The supremacy clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S., CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
118. 402 U.S. 637.
119. Id. at 644.
120. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.01-.79, .99 (Page 1982 & Supp. 1983).
121. 11 U.S.C. § 525 (1982), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 333, 354-55.
122. See supra notes 4, 13 & 60-73 and accompanying text.
123. City of Toledo v. Bernoir, 18 Ohio St. 2d 94, 247 N.E.2d 740 (1969). See supra notes
71-73 and accompanying text.
124. See Perez, 402 U.S. at 637; Duffey, 734 F.2d at 270-71; see also supra notes 56-64
and accompanying text.
125. Duffey, 734 F.2d at 270-72.
126. SENATE REPORT. supra note 2, at 5867.
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bankrupts, or the examination of prospective financial condition or managerial ability . ... [I]n those cases where the causes of a bankruptcy

are intimately connected with the license, grant, or employment in question, an examination into the circumstances surrounding the bankruptcy
will permit governmental units to take appropriate action without running afoul of bankruptcy policy.1"
Therefore, since Congress has stated specifically that the requirement
of future responsibility is permissible, notwithstanding section 525(a),
then section 4509.40 of the Ohio Financial Responsibility Act is valid
as long as it is not applied solely to bankrupts and, thus,
discriminatorily. 12 8
The Duffey court clearly asserted that there was no discrimination
under the Ohio law.1" 9 Proof of future financial responsibility was required of all persons regardless of whether the judgment was stayed or
satisfied.1 30 While at the time of the Duffey case proof of future financial responsibility was not required of all drivers on Ohio highways, the
proof was required of all Ohio drivers who had failed to pay an accident-related judgment within the 30-day time period, whether or not
they subsequently filed bankruptcy. 131 Thus, since the Ohio Financial
Responsibility Act's requirement of proof of future financial responsibility is applied "without exception to any person who fails to satisfy a
judgment for whatever reason, whether because of unwillingness, inadvertance, or inability to pay," '32 and not to bankrupts alone, one can
conclude as the Duffey court did, that this provision of the act is nondiscriminatory. This reasoning is sound in light of the purpose of the
discrimination prohibition in section 525(a) to prevent a direct reaction
against a debtor who avails himself or herself of the protection of the
bankruptcy laws. Any such discrimination would hinder the beneficial
effects of the bankruptcy laws and would seriously damage the fresh
start of the debtor.1 33
Consequently, the state statutory requirement is not in conflict
with the federal statute under the terms of the Perez two-step rule'a
and need not yield to the federal statute under a supremacy clause
analysis. Moreover, even if it is determined that a supremacy clause

127. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 49, at 6126.
128. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5867.
129. Duffey, 734 F.2d at 273.
130. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 525 (1982), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.)
333, 354-55.
131. Duffey, 734 F.2d at 273.
132. Id.
133. 1 BANKR. SERV. (L. Ed.) 1:73 (1979).
134. See supra text acompanying notes 117-19.
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conflict is present, the application of the supremacy clause may be
overcome by proving that the state's examination of circumstances surrounding the bankruptcy negates any violation of section 525(a)'s nondiscrimination policy. 135
C. Development of the Perez Rule
Section 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which prohibits governmental units from interfering with the fresh start granted the bankrupt,
has not been strictly applied for two reasons. First, Congress has not
specified the extent of the limitations on discriminatory actions prohibited by section 525(a). 136 Second, as a result, courts are increasingly
recognizing state justifications for the alleged discriminatory activity.13 7
The legislative history supporting section 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code demonstrates that section 525(a)'s list of prohibited activities is not exhaustive. 13 8 It is further explained that the Perez rule,
which prohibits governmental units from interfering with the fresh
start granted the bankrupt, is a developing one. 139 To this end, it was
noted in the legislative history that the courts must continue to "mark
the contours of the anti-discrimination provision in pursuit of sound
bankruptcy policy." 140 The judicial development of the Perez rule is
exemplified, not only in cases involving discharge of accident-related
judgments, but in other areas as well.
In Grimes v. Hoschler,41 for example, the California Supreme
Court ruled that revocation of a bankrupt building contractor's license
by the state licensing board was invalid in light of Perez 42 because the
effect was to impose additional punishment on those who chose to declare bankruptcy. 43 The California statute was struck down on
supremacy clause grounds because it was in conflict with the congres-

135.
rule).

136.

See infra text accompanying notes 153-56 (concerning the development of the Perez
SENATE REPORT,

supra note 2, at 5867.

137. Weiss, Evaluation of a Bar Applicant's Moral Character:May a State Consider the
Circumstances Surrounding a Discharge in Bankruptcy?, 56 IND. L.J. 703, 705 (1981) (citing
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
138. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5867. See also supra text accompanying notes 2-7.

139.

SENATE REPORT,

supra note 2, at 5867.

140. Id.
141. 12 Cal. 3d 305, 525 P.2d 65, 115 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973
(1975). In Grimes, the court noted that the alleged purpose of the regulation was to protect the
health, safety, and welfare of the public. Id. at 312, 525 P.2d at 69, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 629. The
court, however, noted that under Perez it was necessary to consider, not only the purpose of the
state regulation, but also the effect of the regulation. Id. at 313, 525 P.2d at 69, 115 Cal. Rptr. at
629.
142. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
143. Grimes, 12 Cal. 3d at 315, 525 P.2d at 70, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
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sional mandate of a fresh start for the bankrupt."" Similarly, in Rutledge v. City of Shreveport,'4 5 the district court held that a police officer could not be fired for violating a regulation that prohibited police
officers from filing a petition in bankruptcy. 4 The regulation was
found to be invalid as it conflicted with the bankruptcy code's purpose
of providing the debtor with " 'a new opportunity in life and a clear

field for future effort.'

"147

Yet another example of the development of the Perez rule is Richardson v. PennsylvaniaHigher Education Assistance Agency. 1 48 Pennsylvania law required the state student loan guaranty agency to deny
guaranteed student loan applications filed by former bankrupts.1 49 The
Bankruptcy Court held that the Pennsylvania statute was invalid because section 525(a) required that applicants be treated as if they had
never incurred the discharged debt.' 50 The fact that the agency had an
internal appeals procedure did not lend justification to the state statute
since it was discriminatory practice, in and of itself, to require the former bankrupt to go through such a procedure. 1
The Perez rule has also been applied in cases involving bar applicants who have been denied membership because of their prior status
as a bankrupt.' 5 2 In these cases the courts have examined the circumstances surrounding the bankruptcy discharge when determining
whether an applicant should be accepted to the bar.' 53 The permissibility of the courts' examinations "turns on whether such an evaluation
would stand 'as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.' ,,'54 The state examinations
were held valid because there was a strong state interest which justified
an examination of the surrounding circumstances of a bar applicant's
discharge in bankruptcy.' 55
Consideration of these cases is important because they reveal that

144. Id.
145. 387 F. Supp. 1277 (W.D. La. 1975).
146. Id. at 1281. The purpose of the statute struck down was to remove bankruptcy as an
option to police officers in order that the officers would not be tempted to incur excessive debts and
be vulnerable to temptation. Id. at 1278.
147. Id. at 1279 (quoting Perez, 402 U.S. at 648).

148.
149.
150.

8 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 157 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
Id. at 158.
Id. at 160.

151.

Id.

152. See Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners v. Groot, 365 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam);
Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners v. G.W.L., 364 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1978); In re Gahan, 279 N.W.2d
826 (Minn. 1979).
153.
154.
155.

See cases cited supra note 152.
Weiss, supra note 137, at 705 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
Weiss, supra note 137, at 722.
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the courts, in addressing the Perez rule and section 525(a), will allow a
justification of governmental actions which apparently have a discriminating effect on bankrupts if there is a valid, strong governmental interest. 156 Accordingly, a governmental unit can avoid application of the
supremacy clause by proving that the justification for the governmental
action is great enough to negate any violation of section 525(a)'s nondiscrimination policy.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Duffey v. Dollison1 decision, by holding that proof of future
financial responsibility can be required before reinstatement of driver's
privileges when the accident-related judgment is discharged in bankruptcy, is a clear and distinct development of the Perez rule. 158 The
legislative history which supports section 525(a) specifically documented Congress' intention to leave to the courts the task of marking
the extent of section 525(a)'s prohibition of discriminatory treatment.' 59 Nevertheless, Congress did limit the courts' ability to extend
the parameters of section 525(a)'s prohibitions against "discrimination
or other action based solely on the basis of the bankruptcy, on the basis
of insolvency before or during bankruptcy prior to a determination of
discharge, or on the basis of nonpayment of a debt discharged in the
bankruptcy case."' 10
The Duffey decision should be followed for two reasons. First, the
Sixth Circuit based its decision on sound reasoning as gleaned from the
very persuasive and direct authority in the congressional records, 16 ' as
well as a valid determination that there was no discrimination. 6 2 Second, the Sixth Circuit, by responding to the inconsistency in the lower
courts with a well-reasoned decision, has established a firm policy
which gives accident-related judgment-debtors notice that they will be
subject to the proof of future responsibility requirement contained in
the Ohio Financial Responsibility Act. 63
It is unfortunate that the Duffey court chose to label its decision as
57

156. See id., at 718-23. That author concludes that Congress can not exercise an absolute
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of bankruptcy in light of the Supreme Court's decision
in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Weiss, supra note 139, at 722-23.
The Usery court held that the states' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions can not be displaced. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852. But see Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
157. 734 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1984).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 5 & 136-56.
159. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5867; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 127, at 6126.
160. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 5867.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 45-64 & 142.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 129-32.
163. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4509.01-.79, .99 (Page 1982 & Supp. 1983).
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a "relatively narrow one" 164 by upholding the Ohio Financial Responsibility Act 16 5 only insofar as "the requirement to furnish proof of financial responsibility has become fixed, through certification to the RegisAs noted above,1" 7 the courts have
trar, prior to bankruptcy." '
inconsistently interpreted the constitutionality of financial responsibility
acts. The Sixth Circuit's narrow holding is a positive move toward establishing a consistent policy in favor of the constitutional validity of
the proof of future responsibility requirement. The Sixth Circuit, however, had an opportunity to deliver a broader decision, at least insofar
as defining the extent to which a state could require proof of financial
responsibility. For example, the court could have discussed whether the
financial responsibility requirement was applicable if bankruptcy oc6 8 The
curred during the 30-day period before judgment became fixed.
court also could have delved into the ramifications of the effect of surrounding circumstances.1 6 9 By maintaining its narrow position, the
Duffey court does respond to a precise factual situation with a viable
holding, however, it is unfortunate that the court did not take the opportunity to maintain a broader position that would have perhaps been
treated as dicta, but would have further defined the parameters of section 525(a)'s prohibition of discriminatory treatment.
In conclusion, although the Duffey court had an opportunity to
broaden its opinion, it narrowly maintained that it was not discriminatory to require motorists, whose accident-related judgments have been
satisfied by discharge in bankruptcy, to file proof of financial responsi1 70
To this exbility before their driving privileges are to be reinstated.
17 1
Moreover, memtent, the Duffey decision has already been followed.
bers of the Supreme Court have conceded that a proof of financial

164. Duffey, 734 F.2d at 274.
165. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4509.01-.79, .99 (Page 1982 & Supp. 1983).
166. Duffey, 734 F.2d at 274 (emphasis added).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 82-116.
168. See Duffey. 734 F.2d at 274 (where the court emphasized that its decision only applies
when, after the 30-day period, the judgment has become fixed).
169. Id. The Duffey court mentions the Duffeys' argument that because the "one-bite" approach to obtaining insurance is lenient, the treatment accorded to them should also be lenient. Id.
Under the "one-bite" approach, actual proof of insurance is not required until a motorist incurs an
accident-related judgment and fails to satisfy it within 30 days. Id. at 269. The court dismissed
this argument on the basis of the potential consequences to victims, but failed to delve into the
validity of the "one-bite" approach. Id. at 274.
170. Id.
171. See Holder v. Wisconsin Dep't of Transp., I I BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1347 (Bankr.
E.D. Wis. June 20, 1984), where the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
upheld the validity of a Wisconsin statute which required proof of financial responsibility regardless of whether the accident-related judgment was stayed, satisfied, or discharged in bankruptcy.
Id. at 1349. The Holder court cited the Duffey decision as the primary authority for its decision.
Id. at 1348-49.
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responsibility requirement is valid.' 72 Thus, there are indications that
the Duffey decision will be followed by other courts faced with similar
conflicts between the bankruptcy code and state financial responsibility
statutes.
Marie E. Splees

172. See Perez, where Justice Blackmun maintained in his dissent, which was joined by the
Chief Justice and Justices Harlan and Stewart, that the Arizona statute was valid. His position
was primarily based upon the doctrine of stare decisis and the public policy of protecting
the
general public. Justice Blackmun concluded that a state may require a bankrupt judgment-debtor
to file proof of financial responsibility. Perez, 402 U.S. at 668 (Blackmun J., dissenting).
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